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Abstract 
This study primarily investigates the impact of extreme financial leverage on UK unlisted property fund 
performance over a 11 year period, 2004 to 2014; accordingly the research problem is addressed applying a 
panel auto regression to an extended sample provided by the IPD Property Fund Vision Handbook covering 
funds information over a complete property cycle from 2004 to 2014. The results provide strong evidence in 
support of the traditional theory of capital structure asserting that financial leverage is a significant determinant 
of firm performance. A significant positive relationship is found between Leverage and performance of core and 
value added funds over the cycle but interestingly a significant negative association is seen for opportunistic 
funds as they underperformed through the cycle. Consequently, it is concluded that fund value may be enhanced 
by debt finance but must be kept at minimal levels, as an optimal debt finance level seems to exist considering 
the behaviour of Opportunistic funds over the investigated period. Key to the deduction is that irrespective of 
investment style (gearing intensity) through the cycle, performance persistence seems to sum the success or 
failure of UK unlisted property funds as lagged return showed a significant positive relationship in all regression 
results. Therefore the question of whether an unlisted fund persists in performance becomes even more decisive 
in determining how investors should select funds and develop investment strategies.  
Keywords: Performance, Leverage, Value added, Opportunistic, Unlisted funds 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
Property investment for many is a complex process; from history, investments through a domestic market have 
been the commonest approach to achieve exposure to this dynamic investment class. Even so, since the mid 
1990’s with the introduction of new investment mediums significant growth is being recorded in number and 
aggregate size of listed and unlisted property funds. This growth has helped facilitate growing cross border 
investment in Europe and across the world (Hoesli & Lekander, (2008). With these new avenues, more and more 
investors are using third party managers or indirect vehicles to achieve well-balanced domestic and international 
property exposures. The unlisted fund market also provides investors with the facility to cut specific risk in their 
exposure property investments, particularly as the same capital is shifted into a larger portfolio of assets enabling 
them enjoy the same economies of scale gained by larger investors with more capital. Baum & Farrely (2009) 
highlight that increasing in popularity; unlisted funds currently is the preferred conduit for investors globally and 
predominantly in Europe as more investors are now looking to invest outside their own domestic market.  
In the United Kingdom, the private property sect has seen tremendous growth reaching up to £23billion 
in 2001 even as limited partnerships alone have grown in gross assets as much as from £1billion to £13billion in 
10 years between 1996 and 2006. Further showing the extent of the development in this industry today there is 
over £4billion in the top UK unauthorized property unit trusts and up to £3billion in the top limited partnerships 
(Banfield, 2014 and Baum, 2011) while in Europe INREV(2011) reports that the European non-listed real estate 
industry has raised up to an aggregate of £47.3 billion.  
The growth of this sector further allows its sponsors access high-quality managers to help gain exposure 
to local and international markets, achieve a desired level of diversification and risk diminution that normally 
would be difficult investing directly as they may be faced with handling information asymmetry issues investing 
in an overseas market.  
The property market of the United Kingdom is the largest, most liquid and most transparent of the 
European property markets and the development of indirect property investment vehicles has reached further 
than in any other European country.  
In performance terms, arguably there is sprouting evidence that financial gearing acts as a major 
performance driver for these investment vehicle especially taking to bearing the advantages of better utilizing the 
tax benefits. Moreover, the issuance of debt is a pointer that fund managers are confident of the firm’s ability to 
repay while financial leverage greatly causes variability in returns hence adding to the firm’s beta (financial risk). 
Although in a low interest rate environment, it appears as a free lunch as the return on equity of geared property 
investments exceeds well the superficial risk of property investments (Pandev, 2008). 
The proportion of debt and equity mix in a firms financing investment proposal has been a topic of 
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exhaustive theoretical modelling and empirical investigation over the years in mainstream finance literature 
where its findings have implications on corporate performance. Thus, in examining the fund management 
industry and how its financing decisions affect firm performance, we track fund performance over a complete 
property cycle and examine empirically the impact of Financial Leverage on ex post performance of non-listed 
property investment vehicles in the United Kingdom.  
The rest of the paper is designed as follows. Section 2 reviews literature connected to performance of 
the fund management industry. The data and functional form are introduced in Section3, while Section 4 
presents and analysis the results. Finally, Section 6 makes recommendations and concluding remarks to the study.  
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Blundell, et al (2005) in the article managing portfolio risk in real estate, holistically assess a cross section of UK 
institutional funds, to identify the sources of risk and return in stock level commercial property portfolios. Their 
findings confirm the efforts of Farrelly & Matysiak, (2013) and Baum & Farrelly, (2009) that identify the 
sources as market, stock, fund structure and accounting policy.  
They explain that market risk emanates from segments to which the portfolio is exposed, stock risk are 
the risk continuum from ground rent to speculative developments, age, structure, income quality and 
diversification while fund structure refers to financial leverage(floating rate/fixed rate debt, collaterization), 
vehicle characteristics (age, structure, fees, fiscal efficiency and public market volatility if listed.  
Figure1.0 Components of Risk and Return  
 
Source: Baum and Farrelly, 2009 
The capital structure of property companies is largely a relatively under researched area in the property 
literature. Nevertheless capital structure determinants for general business enterprises have been debated for 
many years representing a major unsolved area in corporate finance literature. Michalas et al (1999) put to test 
the capital structures of small UK firms and resolve that size and gearing is positively related in agreement with 
Frank & Goyal (2004). They also note that profitability and gearing are negatively which is consistent with the 
pecking order theory and in line with Frank & Goyal (2004).  
Fama and French (2002) argued that, due to their level of diversification, larger firms are expected to 
have less volatile earnings, which in return induce a higher Leverage ratio. Rajan and Zingales (1995) stated that 
leverage increases with size because larger firms are better diversified and have a lower probability of being in 
financial distress; lower bankruptcy costs enable them to take on more leverage.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) showed that growth opportunities are significantly negatively associated 
with leverage, which is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2004); on the contrary, Hall et al. (1999) indicated a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and gearing ratios at one with Bevan and Danbolt (2004).  
Morri (2008) concludes that since capital structure literature on real estate companies and in particular 
REITS largely is under researched and even if the specific characteristics of the dynamic industry provides good 
prospects to put to test proven empirical theories; “property assets when fully in operation are considered 
relatively low in volatility and easily managed”. Hence chances for errors are as a result narrow and investors 
have better supervisory power thus greatly reducing the probable agency trouble connecting equity and debt 
holders.  
However Geltner and Miller (2001) explain the main consequence is that an improved quantity of debt 
can be lent against the value of the subject asset thus property investments should be characterised by high debt 
to loan value in contrast with conventional business corporations. 
Closely related to this particular study is the work of Farrelly and Matysiak (2013) who study the 
drivers of UK unlisted property funds using a panel modelling methodology their findings revealed a striking 
asymmetric influence of employing debt finance in unlisted property funds.  
Heuvel & Morawski (2013) in line with Fuerest and Matysiak(2009, 2011) based on a panel data 
analysis showed empirically that leverage boosted performance of German funds in good times and during post 
recovery though more geared funds were not showing signs of underperformance in a falling market. Shilling 
and Wurtzebach (2010) classify a set of direct real estate funds on the basis of their realized returns into core, 
value-add, and opportunistic funds, and conduct a principal component analysis to identify the factors that 
significantly differentiate the performance of the funds across the three style categories. They find that leverage 
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and market conditions are the two most significant determinants of relative performance.  Baum et al. (2011, 
2012) in Alcock et al (2013) suggest that “leverage may not be viewed as a suitable long-term strategy for 
delivering returns in excess of core returns”. In their work they highlight that leverage and market beta are highly 
central in the justification of cross sectional fund returns but further explain that leverage largely appears to 
make a negative influence on fund performance. Nevertheless, their outcome is grounded on the situation on the 
use of a rather small sample examined over a limited period of time.  
Anson and Hudson- Wilson (2003) agree also that leverage is an important determinant of private 
equity fund performance and should be used, albeit in moderation and accountably, in order to contribute 
significantly to performance.  
 
3.0 METHOD  
The study is carried out using a panel data linear regression model where the dependent variable is rate of return 
and independent variables as Fund structure(financial leverage) and ex-post return of 63 United Kingdom Non-
Listed funds; evaluated over a complete property cycle (2004- 2013).  To determine the relationship between the 
variables a correlation matrix will be employed and to determine the degree of significance and impact of the 
independent variables on firm performance the study considers both the pooled and fixed effect model estimation 
technique.  
 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The traditional theory of capital structure postulates that debt capital is cheaper than equity and as such a 
corporation can increase its value by borrowing up to a reasonable limit. This shows that an optimal level of 
leverage or gearing ratio exists. It also asserts that there exist a significant relationship between leverage and 
firm performance value in a company. The theory also posits that there exist a negative relationship between 
leverage and performance. 
Per= F(Leverage) 
Per = β0 + β1Lev+Z+ εt    
Where “per” represents firm performance and “Lev” is leverage. From equation 3.1 the traditional theory assert 
that “Lev” should be statistically significant in determining firm performance “per”. 
Return = β0 + β1Leverage+ β2Lagged Return εt    
The model above shows that firm’s performance depends on capital structure and macroeconomic variables. 
Where “ROI” represents returns on investment (a proxy for firm performance), “LEVERAGE” captures the 
gearing level of firms, A negative relationship between capital structure and returns on investment is expected. 
This is evident from the fact that interest is paid on the debt and this tends to reduce firm performance.  
Also, lagged returns on investment are expected to be positively related to current returns on investment.  
Leverageβ1>0          Lagged Returns β2>0 
 
4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
This segment presents and analysis the descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix and empirical results on the 
impact of leverage on unlisted property funds’ performance in the United Kingdom. 
 
4.1 Distribution of Fund values by investment style at 2014  
Table4.1 visibly points that the composition of core plus and opportunistic funds occupy a comparatively lower 
size in the United Kingdom fund universe. It may show that high gearing levels may not be highly regarded by 
their fund managers with core funds which are lower in their risk profile taken a huge proportion of the United 
Kingdom non listed property funds composition.   
Table 4.1 Distribution of Fund Value by Investment Style  
 Leverage (Debt/GAV 
in %) 
Total Number  Share by Percentage 
Core Funds 0-30 49 77.7% 
Value added (Core Plus) Funds 30-65 7 11.11 
Opportunistic Funds 65 and above 7 11.11 
 
4.2 STATISTICS FOR ANNUAL TOTAL RETURNS AND LEVERAGE  
This table 2.0 tenders vital statistics on the examined unlisted funds. It shows fund total return (in percentage 
terms per annum and leverage which is measured as the ratio of debt to gross asset value in percentage terms 
across the three investment styles spectrum of the unlisted fund industry.  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.18, 2016 
 
74 
Table 4.2 Sample Statistics of Total return and Leverage across Fund Styles (Panel A-D) 
Panel A Full Study period 10year Fund Statistics (2004-2013) 
Funds  Variable Mean Std.Dev N 
Core  Total Return  4.788 1.72 49 
 Leverage 9.45 14.28 49 
Value-add Total Return 8.70 4.70 7 
 Leverage 31.23 15.19 7 
Opportunistic Total Return -0.675 8.48 7 
 Leverage 86.55 17.25 7 
All Non-Listed Fund Total Return 4.35 3.92 60 
 Leverage 33.25 22.70 60 
Panel B 5year Fund Statistics (2004-2008) 
Funds  Variable Mean Std.Dev N 
Core  Total return  6.19 2.46 49 
 Leverage 7.4 8.4 49 
Value-add Total return 8.36 6.22 7 
 Leverage 39.51 47.2 7 
Opportunistic Total return 1.61 10.12 7 
 Leverage 79.13 61.10 7 
All non-listed fund Total return 5.67 4.70 60 
 Leverage 20.01 21.72 60 
 
Panel C 3Year Fund Statistics (2009-2012) 
Funds  Variable Mean Std.Dev N 
Core  Total Return  5.67 2.18 46 
 Leverage 7.70 14.50 46 
Value-add Total Return 8.90 6.12 7 
 Leverage 40.23 40.01 7 
Opportunistic Total Return 1.61 10.12 7 
 Leverage 84.57 17.90 7 
All Total return 5.52 4.57 60 
 Leverage 20.27 23.21 60 
 
Panel D 12 months Fund Statistics (2013-2014)  
Funds  Variable Mean  Std.Dev. N 
Core  Total Return  9.11 2.95 46 
 Leverage 10.01 6.64 46 
Value-add Total Return 11.90 9.43 7 
 Leverage 46.37 12.18 7 
Opportunistic Total Return 2.48 12.00 7 
 Leverage 99.01 24.22 7 
All non-listed fund Total return 8.63 6.03 60 
 Leverage 24.64 31.42 60 
Panel A of Table 4.2 indicates that the average standard deviation of the total returns across all three 
fund styles was 3.92%. Consistent with the risk profile of the examined non listed funds, core funds had the 
lowest variability with a standard deviation of 1.72% followed by value added funds and opportunistic funds 
with 4.7%% and 8.4% respectively.  
Given the underperformance of opportunistic funds in terms of average total returns it appears that the 
risks incurred by investors who chose to deploy their funds in this investment medium where not rewarded not 
contrary to the elaborated risk-return relationship emphasized by prominent academic scholars and researchers; 
as opportunistic funds displayed higher volatility as measured by there clearly higher Standard deviation figures 
throughout the cycle.  
High return variability appears not to coincide with higher returns. This appears to hold in earlier sub-
period (panel B) nut seems to be reversed in panel C. The average leverage across all funds as measured is 
33.25% which indicates that overall UK non-listed funds appears to be medium risk takers although a higher part 
of the population operate a core investment style with 77.7% as shown in earlier analysis. Moreover again 
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consistent with the risk profile core funds show to be very low risk takers with 9.45% on average, value added 
with 39.23% and opportunistic funds grabbing 86.55% of debt finance. This relationship remains consistent 
throughout all periods from Panel A-C.  
 
4.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS  
A fundamental predicament with multiple regression analysis is that of multicollinaerity, which occurs when 
there are too great a linear association between variables to permit the identification of the separate influences of 
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable (Leishman 2003, p78). The implication of this is that when 
high correlation relationship is found between two explanatory variables care will be taken in the course of result 
interpretation. Before the commencement of the regressions the independent variables are tested for multi-
collinearity by means of a correlation coefficient matrix. (Table 4.3)  
Correlation analysis is carried out to find out the relationship between the determinants of capital 
structure and fund performance of the 63 sample UK Non listed property funds. The correlation is significant at 
99% and 95% i.e. 0.01 levels and 0.05 levels. Importantly it should be noted that leverage impact testing is not 
done in the correlation analysis.  
TABLE 4.3 CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX FORM CORE FUNDS  
 TOTAL RETURN LEVERAGE 
Total Return 1 0.1041 
Leverage  1 
   
Source: Author, 2014 
From the computed correlation matrix calculated to gain insight into the relationship between variables to be 
used in further analysis.  
TABLE 4.4 CORRELATON COEFFICIENT MATRIX FOR VALUE ADDED FUNDS  
 TOTAL RETURN LEVERAGE 
Total return 1 -0.2311 
Leverage  1 
   
From the computation above calculated to gain insight into the relationship between the research variables to be 
used in further statistical analysis. The results shows leverage exhibiting a positive relationship with fund 
performance while GDP and inflation produced a positive relationship.   
TABLE 4.5 CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRIX FOR OPPORTUNISTIC FUNDS  
 TOTAL RETURN LEVERAGE 
Total Return 1 -0.5914 
Leverage  1 
   
The computed correlation matrix is calculated to gain insight into the relationship between variables to be used 
in further analysis.  
 
4.4 PANEL REGRESSION FOR NONLISTED FUNDS 
4.4.1 CYCLE PHASE ONE: 2004-2007 (CORE FUNDS)  
TABLE 4.6 PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CORE FUNDS FROM 2004-2007 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const -0.3278 0.16345 0.8840 0.00700*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1500 0.21360 0.1545 0.00100** 
ROI(-1) 0.4780 0.01501** 0.0140 0.85034 
R-squared 0.4563  0.6675  
Adjusted R2 0.2424  0.5500  
P-value(F) 0.0090  0.0005  
Durbin-Watson 1.8500  1.9677  
     
Please note *, ** and *** correspondingly signifies 10%, 5% and 1%.  
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.6 presented shows the comprehensive results for core unlisted firms with pooled and fixed effects 
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run and evaluated.  
Fitting the values to the model:  
ROI=0.8840+0.154Leverage (-1) + 0.014 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.2 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 66.95% of variations in the performance of this 
Fund Style. The explanatory variables are jointly significant in the model and the Durbin Watson statistics 
indicates the absence of autocorrelation.  
From the regressed fixed effect all, the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining 
changes in firm performance level. Leverage clearly has a positive effect on performance through the examined 
period (booming phase of the market). A 100% increase in leverage statistically should increase fund 
performance by 25.45%. The result conforms to prior expectations of a positive relationship between leverage 
and fund performance; conforming with other studies on fund financial structure by Fama & French (2002), 
Frank & Goyal (2004) and Baum & Farrelly (2009). The outcome of the regression also is in tandem with 
traditional finance theories on capital structure since leverage shows a significant impact on performance.  
Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% increase in lagged performance of 
opportunistic funds correspondingly should indicate a 2.1% increase in performance. Conforming with research 
by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on 
persistence of fund returns confirming that it is a guide and indicator for future fund success or failure.  
4.4.2 CYCLE PHASE TWO: 2007- 2010 (CORE FUNDS) 
TABLE 4.7 PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CORE FUNDS 2007-2010 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const -0.3821 0.17560 0.9040 0.03200*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1780 0.21620 -0.1315 0.07600** 
ROI(-1) 0.4110 0.08501** 0.1270 0.09834 
R-squared 0.4521  0.6705  
Adjusted R2 0.3332  0.5470  
P-value(F) 0.0090  0.0004  
Durbin-Watson 1.8500  1.9677  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.7 presented shows the comprehensive results for core unlisted firms with pooled and fixed effects 
run and evaluated.  
Fitting the values to the model:  
ROI=0.3821+0.131Leverage (-1) + 0.127 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.2 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 67.05% of variations in the performance of this 
Fund Style. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes in firm performance 
level. Leverage clearly has a negative effect on performance through the examined period (bottomed out phase 
of the market).  
A 100% increase in leverage statistically should decrease fund performance by 33.61%. The outcome of 
the regression is in tandem with traditional finance theories on capital structure because since leverage shows a 
significant impact on performance; but its impact in these phase explains decisively the risk return relationship 
operating in property investments.  
Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% increase in lagged performance of 
opportunistic funds correspondingly should indicate a 12% increase in performance. Conforming to research by 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on 
persistence of fund returns confirming that it is a guide and indicator of future success or failure.  
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4.4.3 CYCLE PHASE THREE 2010-2013 (CORE FUNDS) 
TABLE4.8 PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CORE FUNDS 2010-2013 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const 0.2200 0.77345 0.1840 0.00600*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1550 0.26530 0.1445 0.0100** 
ROI(-1) 0.4990 0.0111** 0.0140 0.85034 
R-squared 0.2513  0.6875  
Adjusted R2 0.2114  0.5200  
P-value(F) 0.0330  0.0005  
Durbin-Watson 1.3100  1.3677  
     
  
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.8 presented shows the comprehensive results for core unlisted firms with pooled and fixed effects 
run and evaluated.  
Fitting the values to the model:  
ROI=0.220+0.144Leverage (-1) + 0.140 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.3 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 67.05% of variations in the performance of this Fund Style.  
All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes in firm performance 
level. Leverage clearly has a positive effect on performance through the examined period (rising phase of the 
market). A 100% increase in leverage statistically should increase fund performance by 14%.  
Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% increase correspondingly indicates a 1.4% rise 
in performance. Still in line with work done by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. 
(2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on persistence of fund returns confirming that it is a guide and 
indicator for future fund success or failure.  
4.5.1 CYCLE PHASE ONE: 2004-2007 (VALUE ADDED FUNDS) 
TABLE 4.9 PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR VALUE ADDED FUNDS  
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const -0.2288 0.18350 0.8950 0.01000*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1700 0.23310 0.2545 0.00000*** 
GDP 0.1600 0.54055 0.2417 0.60202 
INFLATION 0.3222 0.25300 0.4450 0.00000*** 
RETURN(-1) 0.3380 0.01231** 0.0210 0.77034 
R-squared 0.1558  0.7195  
Adjusted R2 0.3125  0.3920  
P-value(F) 0.0450  0.0022  
Durbin-Watson 1.6400  1.8677  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The presented table (4.9) shows the estimated results for Value added non-listed firms with pooled and fixed 
effects run and evaluated. Fitting the values into the model:  
ROI=0.8840+0.254Leverage (-1) + 0.021 ROI (-1) .............equation4.3 
From the fixed effect regression all the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining 
changes in firm performance level. Leverage clearly has a positive effect on performance of value added funds 
through the economically buoyant period. A 100% increase in leverage will increase fund performance by 
25.45% conforming to prior expectations of a positive relationship between leverage and fund performance.  
This shows that over leveraging positively affects firm performance; similar to the outcome of the core 
funds’ performance regression. This finding correlates with other studies on fund financial structure (Farrelly & 
Matysiak, 2013 and Baum & Farrelly, 2009). The findings also are linear with traditional finance theories on 
capital structure because firms capital structure has a significant impact on success or failure of these vehicles. 
Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm performance. Showing statistical 
significance at 1% level; a 100% increase in lagged performance of opportunistic funds correspondingly should 
indicate a 2.1% increase in performance. Also in line with research by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. 
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(2002), Hahn et al. (2005) and Tomperi (2010)   examining persistence property fund returns as detailed in the 
literature review. 
Furthermore the R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 71.95% of variations in the 
performance of the fund class (medium geared). The explanatory variables are jointly significant in the model 
and the Durbin Watson statistics shows the absence of autocorrelation.  
4.5.2 Cycle Phase 2: 2007- 2010 (Value-added funds) 
Table 4. 10 Panel Regression results for Value added funds 2007-2010 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const -0.1128 0.1565 0.8010 0.00700*** 
LEVERAGE(-1) 0.3530 0.46790 0.0995 0.00100** 
ROI(-1) 0.8380 0.21601** 0.1849 0.85034 
R-squared 0.5163  0.5475  
Adjusted R2 0.2004  0.5010  
P-value(F) 0.0090  0.0005  
Durbin-Watson 1.8880  1.3377  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.10 presented shows the comprehensive results for core plus funds with pooled and fixed effects run 
and evaluated. Fitting the above values to the model:  
ROI=0.112+0.195Leverage (-1) + 0.547 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.4 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 54.75% of variations in the performance of this 
investment Style. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes. Leverage 
clearly has a positive effect on performance through the examined period. A 100% increase in leverage 
statistically should increase fund performance faintly by 9%. Past performance via Lagged return on investment 
has a positive and significant impact on firm performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% 
increase correspondingly indicates a 1.4% rise in performance; in line with work done by Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on persistence of fund 
returns confirming that it is a guide and indicator for future fund success or failure.  
4.5.3 Cycle Phase Three: 2010-2013 (Value-added funds) 
Table 4.11 Panel Regression Results for Value added funds 2010-2013 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const 0.0500 0.10061 0.0040 0.00700*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0700 0.21360 0.3045 0.00100** 
ROI(-1) 0.3850 0.0453*** 0.2044 0.85034 
R-squared 0.4563  0.6499  
Adjusted R2 0.3424  0.4900  
P-value(F) 0.0070  0.0105  
Durbin-Watson 1.9820  2.4077  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.11 presented shows the comprehensive results for Value-added funds with pooled and fixed effects 
run and evaluated. Fitting the above values to the model:  
ROI=0.050+0.304Leverage (-1) + 0.204 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.5 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 64.99% of variations in the performance of this 
fund Style. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes. Leverage clearly has 
a positive effect on performance through the examined period. A 100% increase in leverage statistically should 
improve fund return by 30.4%.  
Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% increase correspondingly indicates a huge 
20.4% rise in performance, very aligned with results of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et 
al. (2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on persistence of fund returns confirming that it is a guide and 
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indicator for future fund success or failure.  
4.6.1 Cycle Phase One: 2004-2007 (Opportunistic Funds) 
TABLE 4.12 PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OPPORTUNISTIC FUNDS 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const 2.1382 0.0000*** 2.4902 0.0000*** 
LEVERAGE -0.1482 0.0185** -0.3559 0.0000*** 
ROI(-1) -01712 0.0000*** 0.2093 0.0006*** 
R-squared 0.4580           0.5491  
Adjusted R2 0.3883           0.4540  
P-value(F) 0.0256           0.0224  
Durbin-Watson 1.5906           1.7220  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The presented table shows the estimated results for Opportunistic unlisted firms with pooled and fixed effects 
run and evaluated. Fitting the values into the model:  
ROI=2.490+0.355Leverage (-1) + 0.209ROI (-1) .............equation4.6 
The R2 shows that the investigated variables jointly account for 54.91% of variations in opportunistic 
funds (highly geared) performance. The explanatory variables are jointly significant in the model and the Durbin 
Watson statistics shows the absence of autocorrelation.  
From the fixed effect regression all, the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining 
changes in firm performance level. Leverage clearly has a negative impact on performance. A 100% increase in 
leverage will reduce fund performance by 35.59%. The result conforms to prior expectations of a negative 
relationship between leverage and fund performance. Apparently this shows that over leveraging negatively 
affects firm performance. 
A reason for this operation of debt funding (excessive debt) reducing fund performance must be the 
compounding nature of interest rates on debt. Also the period of the global financial crisis had a transmittable 
effect on all sectors particularly as investments in property was its prime basis. 
Nevertheless, the findings too are in tandem with traditional finance theories on capital structure 
because leverage has a significant impact on performance. Lagged return on investment has a positive and 
significant impact on firm performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level, a 100% increase in lagged 
performance of opportunistic funds correspondingly should indicate a 20.93% surge in firm performance. This 
finding prominently matches research by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (2005) and 
Tomperi (2010) who demonstrate persistence in fund returns as they conclude finding strong evidence of the 
positive impact of past performance on future performance amidst various measures in their work.  
4.6.2 Cycle Phase Two: 2007- 2010(Opportunistic Funds) 
Table 4.13 Panel Regression results for Opportunistic Funds 2007-2010 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const 2.1621 0.0100*** 2.0922 0.0000*** 
LEVERAGE -0.1482 0.0185** -0.1239 0.0000*** 
ROI(-1) -01712 0.0000*** 0.5983 0.0005** 
R-squared 0.0080           0.6221  
Adjusted R2 0.3343           0.4001  
P-value(F) 0.0206           0.5324  
Durbin-Watson 1.6776           3.0210  
     
 
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.10 presented shows the comprehensive results for core plus funds with pooled and fixed effects run 
and evaluated. Fitting the above values to the model:  
ROI=2.162+0.123Leverage (-1) + 0.598 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.8 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 62.21% of variations in the performance of this 
investment Style. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes. Leverage 
clearly has a negative effect on performance through the examined period. A 100% increase in leverage 
statistically should decrease fund performance moderately by 12.3%.  
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Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% increase correspondingly indicates a 59% rise 
in performance. Still in line with work done by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), Hahn et al. 
(2005) and Tomperi (2010) who elaborate on persistence of fund returns confirming that it is a guide and 
indicator for future fund success or failure.  
4.6.3 Cycle Phase Three (2010-2013) Opportunistic Funds 
Table 4.14 Panel Regression Result for Opportunistic Funds 2010-2013 
Variables POOLED  FIXED EFFECT  
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient p-value 
Const 0.1002 0.0000*** 0.4002 0.0000*** 
LEVERAGE -0.1222 0.0100*** -0.1559 0.0000*** 
ROI(-1) -01122 0.0000*** 0.2324 0.0006*** 
R-squared 0.4180           0.5071  
Adjusted R2 0.5003           0.4340  
P-value(F) 0.3256           0.0274  
Durbin-Watson 1.2206           1.7720  
     
  
DATA INTERPRETATION 
The table 4.14 presented shows the comprehensive results for core plus funds with pooled and fixed effects run 
and evaluated.  
Fitting the above values to the model:  
ROI=0.102+0.015Leverage (-1) + 0.507 ROI (-1) .............equation 4.9 
The R2 shows that the regressors jointly account for 50.7% of variations in the performance of this 
investment Style. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant in explaining changes. Leverage 
clearly has a negative effect on performance through the examined period. A 100% increase in leverage 
statistically should decrease fund returns by 15%. Past performance via Lagged return on investment has a 
positive and significant impact on firm performance. Showing statistical significance at 1% level; a 100% 
increase correspondingly indicates a 50.7% rise in performance. This outcome also matches work by Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005), Carhart et al. (2002), and Tomperi (2010) who demonstrate persistence in fund returns as they 
conclude finding strong evidence of the positive impact of past performance on future performance amidst 
various measures in their work.  
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMMENDATION 
This study has evaluated all 63 unlisted property funds in the United Kingdom, testing for the impact of fund 
managers adopted investment style on the resulting ex-post investment returns employing data over a complete 
property cycle from 2004-2013. Achieving this, the dynamic panel data approach of Arrello and Bond (1991) is 
used as adopted by the work of Farrelly & Matysiak, (2013) and Baum & Farrelly, (2009) is used taking into 
account the correlation that may exist between the lagged dependent variable and the error term.  
The examination outcome confirms financial leverage as a statistically significant fund performance 
driver across all fund styles over the examined time scale (2004-2013) well in line with prominent research by 
Farrelly & Matysiak (2013), Geltner (2006) and conventional finance studies.  
Valiantly the examination does not validate a negative relationship between financial leverage and fund 
performance; with financial leverage proving to be a significant variable affecting fund performance. Financial 
Leverage showed a positive impact on the performance of Core and Value added (Core plus) funds in periods of 
economic boom but a negative relationship with the actual performance of Opportunistic funds through all 
periods in the cycle. Indeed implying that there is an optimal level of leverage and gearing as a highly risky 
investment strategy should be held at medium levels giving keen attention to the economic climate (debt 
financing climate) and taking into consideration it is an investment in a volatile UK market.   
The finding confirm that gearing can be very risky, primarily in the feverish ecstasy of a boom 
inevitably leading to a bust, but can also be very safe (through the cycle) where the loan and cash flows are 
constructive and held at minimal levels as currently  practiced by 78% of the UK non-listed funds( Core and 
Value added funds) 
Performance persistence seems to sum up the success or failure of UK unlisted funds over the examined 
period across all investment styles, irrespective of the degree of leverage and macroeconomic condition. 
Importantly this verifies the empirical evidence that historical performance contains some information about 
future performance and such information may be very imperative for investors and fund managers.  
Hence a fund manager who achieved superior performance over a reference period tends to be 
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consistently successful. Accordingly, it should be expected that in predicting future performance of unlisted 
funds we should continue to see especially core funds outperforming opportunistic funds going objectively with 
the findings of this study.  
The Study confidently recommends the following for fund managers and the fund management industry 
at large:   
• Merely modifying leverage levels apparently does not indicate better performance; hence fund 
managers of currently highly leveraged unlisted property funds (opportunistic funds) in the United 
Kingdom must give more precedence to displaying investment skill to ensure Fund Success. 
• Managers must rely more on their retained earnings to finance property investments projects, placing 
gearing as just the option of last resort. 
• Since fund managers are chief actors in an active approach to fund management, investors should 
engage care in the selection of fund managers. 
• A sterner capital regulatory environment should also be encouraged as a crucial tool in the armoury of 
financial institutions to prevent unprecedented occurrences as seen during the global financial crisis. 
• Performance persistence has an important implication for researchers trying to understand the nature of 
markets. The question of whether an unlisted fund persists is decisive in determining how investors 
should select funds and develop investment strategies. 
Although the UK Non listed property fund population, seem not to be fully given to high risk taking, 
the number growing in gearing levels appears to be on the rise. Thus, fund managers must adopt a more sensitive 
attitude to investment decision making; ever testing phenomenon rather than lamely accepting that high risk 
constantly will lead to high return; though gearing is only an implicit measure of one aspect of risk.  
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